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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to document the performance of analyst recommendations for biotechnology firms listed 
at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange during the period between 2001 and 2010.  Our results show that analysts are 
able to reveal value relevant information via their recommendations.  We report that buy recommendations are 
followed by significantly positive returns and sell recommendations are followed by significantly negative returns.  
However, we also show that performance of analyst recommendations is not uniform across all firms.  It depends on 
the extent of information asymmetries present within firms.  We show that analyst recommendations contain no 
value for firms with the least level of transparency (lowest intellectual capital disclosure, lowest analyst coverage, 
and lowest frequency of recommendations).  However, as information environment improves, value of analyst 
recommendations also goes up. We recommend biotechnology firms to improve on their disclosure levels. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
rior literature documents a strong link between analyst recommendations and subsequent stock 
returns. For instance, Womack (1996) documents that recommendation upgrades tend to outperform 
downgrades. In another related study, Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) find that stocks with the most 
favorable recommendations outperform stocks with the least favorable recommendations. This strand of literature 
argues that superior information processing skills, greater resources, and access to better quality information (both 
public and private) enable analysts to reveal value relevant information to investors via their recommendations 
(Stickel, 1995; Boni and Womack, 2003). However, their ability to disseminate valuable information for firms that 
are difficult to analyze is far from clear. Prior literature suggests that accuracy of analysts’ research is an increasing 
function of transparency. Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001), for example, show that adoption of International Accounting 
Standards by firms positively affect accuracy of analysts’ research. In another related study, Hope (2003) documents 
that analysts’ accuracy improves with the improvement in firm-level public disclosures. Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
also report similar findings by showing that forecast accuracy is positively related to disclosure policies.  
 
This paper is an attempt to document performance of analyst recommendations for biotechnology firms listed at the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange during the period between 2001 and 2010. These firms are inherently hard to analyze. 
It is intuitive to believe that most of value of biotechnology firms is due to intellectual capital. Prior literature argues 
that firms with higher intellectual capital are, generally, hard to scrutinize. Holland and Johanson (2003), for 
instance, note that capital market agents do not value intellectual capital because they cannot comprehend it. Given 
the difficulty that is embedded in valuation of biotechnology firms, it is worth exploring the performance of analyst 
recommendations for these firms. Any evidence indicating that analysts are able to issue value relevant 
recommendations will be especially useful for investors, especially retail investors, who may shy away from 
investing in these firms due to their inability to comprehend complex information of these firms. Recommendations 
with higher value can induce these investors to trade in biotechnology firms. This will, in turn, provide much needed 
liquidity to these firms and will improve their value.  
 
P 
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Our results show that analysts are able to reveal value relevant information via their recommendations. We report 
that buy recommendations are followed by significantly positive returns and sell recommendations are followed by 
significantly negative returns. Our results are consistent with prior literature that considers analyst recommendations 
to be source of significant value for investors. How et al. (2007), for instance, conclude that aggregate changes in 
analyst recommendations are strong predictors of future performance. In another related study, He et al. (2013) 
come to same conclusion and document that stocks with favorable (unfavorable) recommendations on average 
outperform (underperformed) the benchmark index. However, we also show that performance of analyst 
recommendations is not uniform across all firms. It depends on the extent of information asymmetries present within 
firms. We show that analyst recommendations contain no value for firms with the least level of transparency (lowest 
intellectual capital disclosure, lowest analyst coverage, and lowest frequency of recommendations). However, as 
information environment improves, value of analyst recommendations also goes up. We report significant value of 
sell recommendations for firms with the highest level of transparency (highest intellectual capital disclosure, highest 
analyst coverage, and highest frequency of recommendations). For intermediate level of transparency, we report 
significant value of buy recommendations. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the data and Section 3 presents 
assessment of our hypothesis. Section 4 discusses our results and the paper concludes with Section 5. 
 
2. DATA 
 
This paper documents the value of analyst recommendations for the Danish biotechnology firms during the period 
between 2001 and 2010. We will, briefly, discuss the data in the following sub-sections. 
 
2.1 Analyst Recommendations 
 
We obtain the analyst recommendations data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System’s (I/B/E/S) 
international history recommendation database.1 Table 1 documents the descriptive statistics for analyst 
recommendations during our sample period. Our results in Table 1 indicate that there are more buy 
recommendations than hold or sell recommendations throughout our sample. For instance, we show that more than 
50% of recommendations were buy recommendations in 2001. Table 1 also report relatively fewer sell 
recommendations during most of the years in our sample period. For example, we report that analysts issued less 
than 20% of recommendations as sell recommendations in 2010. The results of Table 1 point towards well-
established optimistic bias in analyst recommendations (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006).  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for analyst recommendations 
Year Buy Sell Hold 
2001 66 (56.90%) 14 (12.07%) 36 (31.03%) 
2002 84 (38.01%) 68 (30.77%) 69 (31.22%) 
2003 70 (37.63%) 60 (32.26%) 56 (30.11%) 
2004 62 (43.36%) 44 (30.77%) 37 (25.87%) 
2005 70 (43.21%) 40 (24.69%) 52 (32.10%) 
2006 69 (45.70%) 47 (31.13%) 35 (23.18%) 
2007 70 (35.71%) 53 (27.04%) 73 (37.24%) 
2008 85 (45.45%) 45 (24.06%) 57 (30.48%) 
2009 80 (35.87%) 61 (27.35%) 82 (36.77%) 
2010 77 (42.54%) 34 (18.78%) 70 (38.67%) 
 
2.2 Performance/Value of Analyst Recommendations 
 
This paper measures the performance of analyst recommendations with 1-Day post-recommendation return. We 
define 1-Day post-recommendation return (RET) as the difference between 1-Day post-recommendation gross 
                                                
1 For the purpose of this paper, we aggregate the I/B/E/S ratings of 1 and 2 as buy, and 4 and 5 as sell. Our decision to aggregate different ratings 
into a single category depends on the fact that there are very few strong sell recommendations (around 4%) in our sample. Most of the 
unfavorable recommendations are sell.  
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return and 1-Day post-recommendation market return. The stock price data and the corresponding market index data 
required to compute RET are obtained from the Datastream.  
 
2.3 Control Variables 
 
This paper uses the following firm-specific characteristics as control variables. The data for control variables is 
obtained from the Worldscope. 
 
•   SIZE: We measure size by log of market capitalization. Conventional wisdom suggests that large 
firms have lower agency problems due to increased interest from stock market participants (investors 
and analysts). Lower agency problems should lead to better stock price performance of large firms 
(Crawford et al., 2012).  
•   LEVERAGE: We measure leverage by total debt to total asset ratio. High leverage exposes firms to 
greater financial risk. High risk should result in lower stock returns (Mitton, 2002). 
•   GROWTH: This paper measures GROWTH by growth in earnings per share. Stock market 
participants are expected to favor high growth firms. Greater attention awarded to high growth firms 
should translate into better information environment. We argue that better information environment 
should be positively associated with stock returns. Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) also document that 
firms with higher growth have better stock price performance. 
•   MBR: We define MBR as market value to book value ratio. Investors consider market value to book 
value ratio as a measure of risk. High risk deters investors and therefore deteriorates the information 
environment. As a result, we should expect negative relationship between market value to book value 
ratio and stock price performance. 
 
Table 2, Panel A, documents the average/mean values for our control variables, while Table 2, Panel B, documents 
the correlation between different control variables. An interesting observation from Panel A is the relatively low 
level of leverage in biotechnology firms. Our results show that, on average, biotechnology firms have debt to asset 
ratio of less than 20%. It may indicate lower ability of biotechnology firms to raise external capital. Given lower 
tangibility of their assets, it is possible that lenders do not provide enough capital to them. Furthermore, our results 
in Panel B show low correlation between the control variables. Therefore, we are able to use all control variables 
together in our regression analyses. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of control variables 
Panel A. Summary statistics of control variables 
 Mean Median 
SIZE 16.6518 16.7377 
LEVERAGE 0.1797 0.1381 
MBR 8.6725 4.6100 
GROWTH 0.0878 0.0715 
 
Panel B. Correlation matrix 
 SIZE LEVERAGE MBR GROWTH 
SIZE 1.0000    
LEVERAGE -0.1733 1.0000   
MBR 0.0717 0.6318 1.0000  
GROWTH 0.0454 0.0402 0.0649 1.0000 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The most obvious question, while analyzing recommendations, is whether or not recommendations predict future 
returns. That is, do analysts uncover valuable information while making their recommendations? If so, their 
recommendations should predict future stock returns (Womack, 1996; Farooq, 2013). However, if the information 
they are revealing is already known to the public or is not valuable, there should be no relationship between their 
recommendations and future returns. In order to document whether analysts reveal any valuable information in their 
recommendations, we estimate the following regression equations with 1-Day post-recommendation return (RET) as 
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a dependent variable and two dummy variables representing whether the recommendation is a buy recommendation 
(BUY) or whether it is a sell recommendation (SELL) as independent variables. It is important to mention here that 
we will not have a problem of perfect multicollinearity due to the presence of hold recommendations in our sample. 
If analysts are informative, the coefficient estimate of BUY should be positive and significant, while the coefficient 
estimate of SELL should be negative and significant. In addition, we also add log of firm’s total assets (SIZE), total 
debt to total asset ratio (LEVERAGE), growth in earnings per share (GROWTH), and market-to-book ratio of a firm 
on the day of recommendation (MBR) as control variables.2 Our regression equations take the following form: 
 
RET =α +β1 BUY( )+β2 SELL( )+ε  (1) 
 
and 
 
RET =α +β1 BUY( )+β2 SELL( )+β3 SIZE( )+β4 LEVERAGE( )+β5 GROWTH( )+β6 MBR( )+ε  (2) 
 
The results for our analysis are reported in Table 3. Our results show that buy recommendations are followed by 
significant positive returns and sell recommendations are followed by significant negative returns. We report 
significant positive coefficient for BUY and significant negative coefficient for SELL. We argue that investors in 
biotechnology sector can trade profitably on analyst recommendations. The results of this table are important 
because firms in biotechnology sectors are characterized by increased information asymmetries. Our results indicate 
that investors can reduce some of information asymmetries associated with biotechnology firms by following 
analyst recommendations. 
 
Table 3. Performance of analyst recommendations 
 Equation (1) Equation (2) 
BUY 0.0030* 0.0036** 
SELL -0.0053** -0.0053** 
SIZE  0.0017** 
LEVERAGE  0.0151* 
MBV  -0.0120* 
GROWTH  -0.0058* 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 1393 1393 
F-value 1.64 1.56 
Adjusted R-square 0.020 0.030 
Note: The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
4.1 Intellectual Capital Disclosure and Performance of Analyst Recommendations 
 
Intellectual capital is one of the most important assets of any firm operating in the biotechnology sector. It can be 
considered as an information construct that embeds information about long-run sustainability (Hayton, 2005). Given 
that long-run sustainability is an important determinant of investors’ decision to invest, lower disclosure regarding 
intellectual capital should increase information asymmetries. We argue that higher information asymmetries should 
reduce value of analyst recommendations. In order to test this conjecture, we divide our sample into three groups, 
ranging from high intellectual capital disclosure to low intellectual capital disclosure, and re-estimate Equation (2) 
for all groups. The data for intellectual capital disclosure is same as the one used in Farooq and Nielsen (2014). The 
results of our analysis are reported in Table 4. As expected, we should that analyst recommendations do not have 
any value for a group of firms that have the lowest disclosure of intellectual capital. However, for the other two 
groups, we show significant but asymmetric value of analyst recommendations. Our results show that sell 
recommendations have significant value for firms that have the highest disclosure of intellectual capital. For this 
                                                
2 We used robust regression in STATA for all of the regression estimations done in this paper. Robust regression produces those coefficients that 
are consistent with OLS assumptions.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 383 The Clute Institute 
group, buy recommendations contain no value. We report significantly negative coefficient of SELL and 
insignificant coefficient of BUY for this group. We also show that sell recommendations have insignificant value for 
firms that have intermediate level of intellectual capital disclosure. We report insignificantly coefficient of SELL. 
For this group, buy recommendations contain significant value. We report significantly positive coefficient of BUY 
for this group. 
 
Table 4. Effect of intellectual capital disclosure on the performance of analyst recommendations 
 High Disclosure Medium Disclosure Low Disclosure 
BUY 0.0006 0.0070*** 0.0023 
SELL -0.0067*** 0.0002 -0.0096 
SIZE -0.0008 0.0019* 0.0031 
LEVERAGE -0.0297 0.0258* 0.0175 
MBV 0.4934*** 0.0086 -0.0184* 
GROWTH -0.0618*** -0.0048 -0.0043 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 410 455 528 
F-value 1.58 1.62 1.25 
Adjusted R-square 0.049 0.053 0.055 
Note: The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
4.2 Analyst Coverage and Performance of Analyst Recommendations 
 
Analysts are the agents that collect, interpret, and disseminate public and private information (Michaely and 
Womack, 1999). In doing so, they reduce information asymmetries between firms and stock market participants. 
Farooq and Satt (2014) suggest that resolution of information asymmetries are more pronounced for those firms that 
have higher analyst coverage. Greater is the extent of analyst coverage, more is the information collected and 
disseminated. Consequently, we argue that performance of analyst recommendations should be an increasing 
function of the extent of analyst coverage. In order to test this conjecture, we divide our sample into three groups, 
ranging from high analyst coverage to low analyst coverage, and re-estimate Equation (2) for all groups. The results 
of our analysis are reported in Table 5. Our results are qualitatively the same as Table 4 in a way that we report no 
value of analyst recommendations for firms with the lowest analyst coverage. While for firms with the highest 
analyst coverage, we report significant value of sell recommendations and insignificant value of buy 
recommendations. For intermediate level of analyst coverage, we report insignificant value of sell recommendations 
and significant value of buy recommendations. 
 
Table 5. Effect of analyst coverage on the performance of analyst recommendations 
 High Coverage Medium Coverage Low Coverage 
BUY 0.0013 0.0056** 0.0031 
SELL -0.0063** -0.0007 -0.0105 
SIZE -0.0052 0.0037* -0.0031* 
LEVERAGE -0.0246 0.0199* -0.0036 
MBV -0.0184 -0.0085 -0.0013 
GROWTH -0.0244 -0.0087 -0.0032 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 421 491 480 
F-value 2.10 1.39 1.79 
Adjusted R-square 0.073 0.043 0.074 
Note: The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
4.3 Frequency of Recommendations and Performance of Analyst Recommendations 
 
Frequency of analyst recommendations is another measure that may proxy for the information environment of firm. 
We argue that greater is the frequency of analyst recommendations, more id the disclosure of relevant and timelier 
information. Given that analysts care about their reputation, they would issue recommendations more frequently for 
firms for which they have access to relevant information (Stickel, 1992). We argue that performance of analyst 
recommendation is higher for firms that have higher frequency of analyst recommendations. In order to test this 
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conjecture, we divide our sample into three groups, ranging from high frequency to low frequency, and re-estimate 
Equation (2) for all groups. As was shown earlier, Table 6 shows qualitatively the same as before. We report no 
value of analyst recommendations for firms with the lowest frequency of recommendations. While for firms with the 
highest frequency of recommendations, we report significant value of sell recommendations and insignificant value 
of buy recommendations. For intermediate frequency of recommendations, we report insignificant value of sell 
recommendations and significant value of buy recommendations. 
 
Table 6. Effect of frequency of recommendations on the performance of analyst recommendations 
 High Frequency Medium Frequency Low Frequency 
BUY 0.0022 0.0063** 0.0027 
SELL -0.0065** -0.0033 -0.0062 
SIZE -0.0046 0.0015 0.0001 
LEVERAGE -0.0061 0.0465** 0.0133 
MBV -0.2529 -0.0227 -0.0186* 
GROWTH 0.0698** -0.0099 -0.0043 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 401 465 527 
F-value 2.29 1.95 1.36 
Adjusted R-square 0.080 0.050 0.054 
Note: The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper documents the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and value of analyst recommendations 
for biotechnology firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange during the period between 2001 and 2010. We 
show that analyst recommendations have significant investment value. We report that stock prices react significantly 
to buy and sell recommendations. Our results show that buy recommendations are followed by significantly positive 
returns and sell recommendations are followed by significantly negative returns during our sample period. The 
findings are consistent with prior literature that considers analyst recommendations to be source of significant value 
for investors (How et al., 2007; He et al., 2013). However, we show that value of analyst recommendations is not 
uniform across all firms. We show that analyst recommendations contain no value for firms with the least level of 
transparency (lowest intellectual capital disclosure, lowest analyst coverage, and lowest frequency of 
recommendations). However, as information environment improves, value of analyst recommendations also goes 
up. We report significant value of sell recommendations for firms with the highest level of transparency (highest 
intellectual capital disclosure, highest analyst coverage, and highest frequency of recommendations). For 
intermediate level of transparency, we report significant value of buy recommendations. This paper has important 
implications for firms operating in more opaque sectors, such as biotechnology firms. Our results show that analyst 
recommendations are more valuable for those firms that have better information environment. We argue that 
valuable recommendations can result in attracting investors. Greater interest from investors should, eventually, 
translate into higher valuation of these firms. Therefore, we propose that firms operating in more opaque sectors 
should expend considerable resources on improving their disclosures and information environment. We would like 
to mention that some caution should be observed towards our results. We did study all biotechnology firms in 
Denmark, but the sample size is relatively small. Therefore, our results may lack generalization.  
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